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Abstract
This article presents a methodology to determine the optimal intensity of Incident
Management (IM) on the road in order to reduce time losses of road users. We combine
the probability of time loss because of an incident with the expected average time loss in
the cost function of the road user. A new element is that the elasticity of demand is
included in the model. The change in welfare because of IM will be overestimated if the
elasticity of demand is not included in the model. In a numerical example, we show that
this overestimation can increase by up to 30 per cent for roads where the number of road
users is close to capacity. Therefore, there can be a risk of overinvesting in IM.
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1.0 Introduction
This study presents a methodology to estimate the beneﬁts of policies
that reduce incident-related congestion. The main objective of this paper
is to include the elasticity of demand in the model that is used for esti-
mating these beneﬁts. Earlier studies assumed inelastic demand, and
therefore the lower travel costs because of less incident-related congestion
have no eﬀect on the number of travellers on the road. We use a simple
model for one road to show the implication of the assumption of inelastic
demand.
Incidents on roads result in non-recurrent congestion and longer
travel times for road users. Governments try to minimise the eﬀects of
incidents by means of Incident Management (IM) which has two goals.
The ﬁrst goal is reducing the incident duration. Lower incident durations
result in lower time losses for road users. The second goal is to improve
the safety of the people that are involved in the incident, for example,
emergency service personnel. In this paper we analyse the beneﬁts of
the ﬁrst goal of IM. We show how the elasticity of demand aﬀects the
beneﬁts of IM and therefore the optimal intensity of IM. We summarise
the stages of the IM process in Figure 1.
In Figure 1 the detection time is given by t1 t0. The response time of
the emergency vehicle is given by t3 t1. Finally, the incident clearance
time is given by t4 t3. The incident duration is the sum of the detection
time, the response time, and the clearance time t4 t0 (Nam and
Mannering, 2000). During this time period the capacity of the road is
lower than in the normal situation. If the number of road users is higher
than the reduced capacity, this will result in a queue.
Besides the study of Nam and Mannering (2000) there are other
studies that investigate the factors that determine the duration of the
incident. For example, Lee and Fazio (2005) show that the response time
depends on the severity of the crash. Crashes with only property damage
Figure 1
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had 20 per cent longer response times than crashes with injuries and
fatalities. Also, Hall (2002) analyses response times by accounting for
spacing between interchanges and a penalty for changing directions.
Other studies investigate the beneﬁts of IM. Bertini et al. (2004) show
that there are several types of beneﬁt because of IM. Besides reduced time-
losses there are also environmental beneﬁts and safety beneﬁts because of
a reduction in the number of secondary incidents. Skabardonis et al.
(1998) show in a cost–beneﬁt analysis that the freeway service patrol in the
Los Angeles area is cost eﬀective. Carson et al. (1999) calculate the cost-
eﬀectiveness of incident response teams in Washington State. They both
ﬁnd that the beneﬁts are four times higher than the costs. Guin et al.
(2007) ﬁnd that the beneﬁts of the implementation of an IM programme,
that is part of an advanced transportation management system, are 4.4
times higher than the costs.
In the Netherlands there are four studies that investigate the eﬀects of
incidents and the role of IM. Schrijver et al. (2006), Kouwenhoven et al.
(2006), and van Reisen (2006) estimate that approximately 20 per cent of
all queuing is due to incidents. Schrijver et al. (2006) calculate that
without extra IM, the time losses because of incidents would be 65 per
cent higher and conclude that IM is very cost-eﬀective. Finally, Wilmink
and Immers (1996) show that IM strategies can reduce incident-related
congestion costs by nearly one-half. All studies analyse the beneﬁts of
IM in a framework of inelastic demand.
An incident is a stochastic event. This event is determined by three
factors. First, the characteristics and the behaviour of the road users
aﬀect the incident probability. Examples are alcohol use or the age of the
driver (Alexander et al., 2002). The second group of factors are the
external factors, such as the road characteristics or the weather condi-
tions. Finally, the number of incidents depends on the number of road
users. The analysis of Shefer and Rietveld (1997) shows that the number
of incidents is increasing in the number of road users, but if congestion is
extreme, the number of incidents will be decreasing and the severity of
accidents is less. One can imagine that in a gridlock situation there will
be fewer incidents than when people are driving at a higher speed.
Peirson et al. (1998) and Noland and Quddus (2005) investigate the
relationship between incidents and traﬃc ﬂow and ﬁnd that the number
of incidents is increasing in the number of road users.
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: in Section 2 we
model the time losses in the event of an incident. Section 3 analyses the
probability of time losses because of an incident in more detail, taking
into account the relationship between traﬃc ﬂow and the number of
incidents. In Sections 4 and 5 the probability of a time loss because of an
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incident, and the resulting average time loss, are combined in an average
cost function for the road user. This cost function is used to calculate the
change in social welfare if more intensive IM is introduced. Section 6
shows how the optimal intensity of IM can be determined, and how the
elasticity of demand changes the optimal intensity of IM.
2.0 Modelling Time Losses in the Event of an Incident
In this section a model is introduced for a single road from A to B. On
this road there is only congestion because of incidents. The incident
duration (ID) is a variable in the model and can be inﬂuenced by IM.
The length of the queue behind the incident is a function of the incident
duration and the growth factor of the queue, as shown in Figure 2 (Hall,
1993).
The incident occurs at time t0 and ends at time t4, therefore the ID is
equal to t4 t0. At time t6 the queue ends. The y-axis shows the number
of vehicles in the queue. The queue grows by a growth factor, rg. This
growth rate is equal to the number of entering road users, that is, the
ﬂow, F, minus the capacity after the crash, Ccrash. We assume that F is
constant over time. Both F and Ccrash are measured in vehicles per
minute. If the incident is cleared, the queue will shrink with shrink rate
ra, which is equal to the normal capacity, C, minus F. Hall (1993) shows
that the total time loss is given by equation (1):
TTL(ID) ¼ 1
2
 rg  ID2 

1þ rg
ra

: ð1Þ
If IM is introduced, ID will decrease. There is a quadratic relationship
between the total time loss and the incident duration. The reason is that
Figure 2
Total Time Loss in Case of an Incident
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per minute the duration of the queue increases, and so does the number
of travellers who are involved in the queue. Equation (2) shows the
marginal change in the total time loss if the ID changes:
@TTL
@ID
¼ ID

rg þ
r2g
ra

: ð2Þ
The eﬀect of IM is higher on roads with a small shrink rate, ra. For these
roads the normal ﬂow is close to the normal capacity. Second, the eﬀect
is higher on roads with a higher growth rate of the queue. Third, for
longer incidents the eﬀect of IM is higher. Equation (1) shows the total
time loss in the event of an incident. To calculate the average Time Loss
(TL) per road user, we divide the total time loss by the number of road
users which is equal to (t6 t0)F.1 In equation (3) the average indivi-
dual time loss per road user aﬀected by the incident is derived:
TL(F ; IDÞ ¼ TTL(ID)
F  ID

1þ rg
ra

¼ 1
2
 ID rg
F
¼ 1
2
 ID

1 Ccrash
F

: ð3Þ
The average time loss per road user is lower if the ID decreases, and if
the ratio of Ccrash and F is smaller. Equation (3) will be used in the
average cost function of the road user.
3.0 Incident Probabilities
The incident probability depends on the traﬃc ﬂow F. This empirical
relationship is frequently estimated in accident prediction models (see,
for example, Greibe, 2003; Hiselius, 2004; Caliendo, 2007). Diﬀerent
types of incident have a diﬀerent relationship with the ﬂow F. We specify
the relationship between the number of incidents and the traﬃc ﬂow in
equation (4):
NðFÞ ¼ l Fg þ k F þ c: ð4Þ
1Equation (3) is always larger than zero because F>Ccrash, otherwise the time loss is 0. Note that the
capacity C drops out, but that it aﬀects the time loss by Ccrash. It is also possible to specify
Ccrash ¼ r C with 04r4 1. Note also that when Ccrash¼ 0, the average time loss of the drivers
involved is simply equal to 0.5 ID.
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Equation (4) includes three types of incident: exogenous events, one-
sided incidents, and two-sided incidents. The exogenous events have no
relationship with the ﬂow F and are given by c. Examples are bad
weather or a collapsing bridge. These types of event occur independently
of the number of road users. For the one-sided incidents there is a pro-
portional relationship given by k F . The breakdown of a car falls into
this category. If there are more cars on the road, the probability of a
breakdown of one of these cars increases proportionally. Finally, the
relationship between two-sided incidents and the traﬃc ﬂow is described
by l Fg. Dickerson et al. (2000) show that if there are F cars on the
road, every car can crash into another car, so the probability is propor-
tional to F (F 1)/2. Therefore, the value of g is expected to be between
1 and 2 if travellers do not change their behaviour if there are more cars
on the road. From equation (4) we can derive the marginal accident rate
(Vickrey, 1968; Jansson, 1994):
@NðFÞ
@F
¼ g l Fg1 þ k: ð5Þ
Equation (5) shows how the number of incidents is aﬀected by a change
in the number of road users. Since g, k, l > 0 we ﬁnd the number of
incidents is increasing in F. The number of incidents N(F ) can be used to
determine the probability that a driver on the road is confronted with a
time loss because of an incident. This probability depends on the period
of queueing t6 t0 shown in Figure 2 and the number of incidents N(F ).
Equation (6) shows the relationship between p(F ) and N(F ), where N(F )
is the number of incidents per year:
pðFÞ ¼ NðFÞ  ðt6t0Þ
60 24 365 : ð6Þ
The numerator indicates for a certain road how many minutes per year
that there is a queue because of an incident.2 The denominator indicates
how many minutes there are in one year. The ratio between the two is
the probability that a driver on the road is confronted with a time loss
because of an incident.
If the number of incidents increases, p(F ) will increase. But p(F ) is
also increasing in the length of the queuing period t6 t0. The previous
insights can be used to derive the expected average-user cost function for
someone who travels from A to B. We assume that if there is no incident,
2To keep the analysis simple, we do not consider overlapping incident spells. Secondary crashes can be
included by using p(F, ID) instead of p(F ). In that case, the eﬀect of reducing the incident duration also
reduces p and, therefore, the beneﬁts of a reduction in the incident duration will be higher in a model
with secondary crashes than in a model without secondary crashes.
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the road user faces no congestion, so there is only non-recurrent con-
gestion on this link. The expected average time loss for the road users is
equal to the average time loss in the event of an incident, TL(F, ID),
multiplied by the probability of a time loss because of an incident p(F ).
The expected average costs for a trip from A to B are given by equation
(7):
EðACÞ ¼ co þ a ðTf þ pðFÞ  TLðF ; IDÞÞ: ð7Þ
In equation (7), co is a ﬁxed non-time cost component for the trip made:
for example, fuel and toll costs. The travel time for the trip is given by
the free-ﬂow travel time Tf, and the value of travel time is given by a.
The expected average costs are increasing in F since p(F ) and TL(F, ID)
are increasing in F.
On the demand side, we assume a linear demand function indicating
the willingness-to-pay for the use of the link.3 If for a certain road user
the expected average costs are lower than the willingness to pay, he will
enter the road. The demand side of the model is given by equation (8):
dðgpÞ ¼ F ¼ r b gp: ð8Þ
In equation (8), r is a certain constant indicating the ﬂow if the expected
average costs are 0, and gp is the generalised price for using the road.
Since we consider only one link, the demand d(F ) is equal to the ﬂow F.
The parameter b is the slope of the demand curve and shows how
sensitive the demand is for changes in the expected average costs.
Equation (9) shows the relationship between the value of b and the
elasticity of demand E:
E ¼ @dðgpÞ
@gp
 gp
F
¼ b gp
F
) b ¼ E  F
gp
: ð9Þ
If the demand curve is ﬂatter, the demand is more elastic. This is
important for the welfare analysis in the next section.
4.0 Welfare Analysis
We now have enough elements to determine the optimal intensity of IM.
Every intensity results in an incident duration that determines the expected
average costs and the demand for trips from A to B. The intersection of
3It is also possible to use an iso-elastic demand curve, as done by Arnott et al. (1988), but a linear
demand curve makes computations easier.
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the demand curve (equation (8)) with the expected average cost curve
(equation (7)) results in a user equilibrium and a corresponding equili-
brium price. This section addresses the eﬀect of IM on this equilibrium
and the eﬀect of the elasticity of demand. The change in welfare is given
by comparing the welfare before and after the introduction of IM.
Figure 3 shows the eﬀect of more IM with inelastic demand. The
demand curve is vertical in that case. The expected average cost curve
after introducing more IM shifts from E(AC) to E(AC)IM, and therefore
the equilibrium average costs decrease from gp 0 to gpIM. The equilibrium
ﬂow before and after introducing more IM is given by F 0. The demand is
equal in both cases because a change in the expected average costs
does not aﬀect the number of road users. The change in social welfare4
is given by the area B and is equal to F 0  (gp 0  gpIM). In the remainder
of this section the assumption of inelastic demand is dropped, and the
elastic case is compared with the inelastic case to show the eﬀect of
ignoring the elasticity of demand when calculating the social beneﬁts
of IM.5 Figure 4 shows the case where demand is elastic.
In Figure 4 the expected average costs before the introduction of
more IM are indicated by E(AC). After the introduction of more IM, the
expected average costs for a trip decrease to E(AC)IM. If demand is
assumed to be inelastic the demand curve is given by d(F )E¼ 0. The
intersection with E(AC) gives the equilibrium generalised price gp 0 and
the corresponding equilibrium number of trips F 0. After the introduction
Figure 3
Welfare Change because of a Higher Intensity of IM
0 F ′ F
d(F ) E(AC)
E(AC)IM
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C
B
€
gp′
gpIM
4The change in social welfare is given by the area under the demand curve minus the total costs. It is
assumed that there are no external eﬀects.
5For empirical studies about the elasticity of demand we refer to De Jong and Gunn (2001), Goodwin
et al. (2004) and Graham and Glaister (2004).
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of more IM the equilibrium price will decrease to gpIM(E¼ 0). The
welfare change is indicated by BþB 0. If demand is assumed to be elastic,
the demand curve is given by d(F ). The new equilibrium price is given by
gpIM, and the corresponding number of road users by FIM. In this new
equilibrium, the number of road users is higher because the introduction
of more IM results in a lower price for a trip. The welfare change in this
case is equal to BþC.
If we compare the welfare change under the condition of elastic
demand with the welfare change under the condition of inelastic demand,
we can conclude that there is an overestimation of B 0 C if demand is
assumed to be inelastic.6 If elastic demand is ignored, that there will be
more road users is ignored because of the lower price after the intro-
duction of IM. Therefore, there will be an underestimation of welfare
corresponding to the area C related to new road users. But there is also a
countereﬀect. Because of the increase in demand, there will also be an
increase in the expected average time loss (equation (3)) and in the prob-
ability of time loss because of an incident (equation (6)). Therefore, the
entry of new road users results in a lower potential change in welfare for
the drivers already on the road (B 0).
To show how large this overestimation can be, we give a numerical
example. We take a road with high capacity use (95 per cent), and a road
with average capacity use (75 per cent) because the results diﬀer
substantially.7 The shape of the expected average costs E(AC) depends
on several assumptions as shown in Table 1.
Figure 4
Welfare Change because of more IM with Elastic Demand
0 F ′ FFIM
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E(AC)
E(AC)IMC
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D
E
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€
gp′
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gpIM(E = 0)
6It can be shown that it is always true that B 0 >C.
7We could also consider a road with a low capacity use, but since the overestimation is very small in that
case it is not really interesting in this context.
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Hoekstra and Van Zutphen (2005) estimate the number of incidents
on main roads in the Netherlands at 17,000 per year. AVV (2007)
estimate the number of incidents at 30,000 per year. We adopt an
intermediate value of 25,000 incidents per year, that is approximately 64
incidents per 20 kilometres. We assume that every type of incident, as we
deﬁne it in equation (4), represents one third of the total number of
incidents. Tseng et al. (2005) estimate a VOT of approximately €10/hour.
As an upper limit for the generalised cost elasticity we assume 1.95.8
Figure 5 shows the overestimation of the change in welfare if the
elasticity of demand is assumed to be 0. The x-axis shows the adopted
elasticity.
Figure 5 shows for this numerical example that the overestimation of
social welfare can be 25 per cent if the elasticity of demand is assumed to
be 0, but it is 1.5 in reality. This result only holds for roads with high
capacity use. For roads with an average capacity use the overestimation
is small and around 2 per cent. These results are not given to cast doubt
on the usefulness of IM. They only show that, because of the elasticity of
demand, the potential welfare gain of more IM is smaller than one would
expect. In the next section we show the consequences for the optimal
intensity of IM.
Table 1
Assumptions for the Parameters in the Model
Symbol Description Value Dimension
E Elasticity of demand between 0 and 1.95
F 0 Number of road users in equilibrium high capacity use: 1,725
average capacity use: 1,400
cars/h
Ccrash Capacity after the incident 370 cars/h
co ﬁxed (non-time) cost component 0.39 eurocent/km
a Value of time 10 euro’s/h
ID Incident duration 35 min
t Reduction of the incident duration 2 min
L Length of the road 20 km
S Speed 100 km
C Normal capacity of the road 1,850 cars/h
g Strength of the relationship between
F and two-sided incidents
2
8The elasticity of demand for travel time is estimated by de Jong and Gunn (2001). They ﬁnd a value of
0.39. The costs for travel time are approximately one-ﬁfth of the total generalised costs. If we assume
additivity of the cost components, the maximum value of the generalised cost elasticity will be 1.95.
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5.0 Optimising IM
In this section we use the insights of the previous section to determine
the optimal intensity of IM for two policy options: extra ICT and extra
emergency services. ICT improves the communication during the IM-
process and therefore reduces the incident duration (Wagtendonk et al.,
2005). The ﬁxed costs for introducing ICT are high, but the marginal
costs are low. An example of ICT policy is introducing automatic detec-
tion of incidents with cameras (Versavel, 1999). Suppose this reduces the
ID by one minute: its beneﬁts are given in Figure 6.9 These beneﬁts must
be higher than the introduction costs to make the introduction of
cameras welfare-improving.
Figure 6 shows that for roads with capacity use and E¼1.5, the
introduction costs must be lower than €2.25 million per year. If the
elasticity of demand is ignored (E¼ 0), the maximal introduction costs
are €2.83 million per year. When inelastic demand is assumed, the intro-
duction of extra ICT is more likely than if elastic demand is included.
This result is consistent with our ﬁndings in Section 4.
Figure 5
Overestimation of the Change in Social Welfare because of more IM if the
Elasticity of Demand is Ignored (High and Average Capacity Use)
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9We use the assumptions of Table 1.
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For roads with average capacity use the overestimation is smaller (2
per cent). Also, the change in welfare is ﬁve times lower than for roads
with high capacity use. This result shows the importance of the diﬀeren-
tiation of IM. Roads with higher capacity use must have a higher
intensity of IM, since the potential change in welfare is much higher.
The second policy option is introducing extra emergency services. The
ﬁxed costs are in this case relatively low, but the marginal costs are high.
If extra emergency services are introduced, the eﬀect of an extra emer-
gency service depends on the number of emergency services already in
use. The eﬀect of the second emergency service will be higher than the
eﬀect of the third vehicle. Suppose that we have a road between A and B
with length L. The probability of an incident is homogenously distributed
along the road. We assume that the distance to this link for an emergency
service is equal to 0.10 Therefore, the emergency services are positioned
Figure 6
Beneﬁts of Automatic Detection of Incidents for Two Roads (High and
Average Capacity Use)
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10We assume that the constant distance to the link L is 0. Since we work with the marginal response
time, the constant will drop out if we take the ﬁrst derivative of the average response time.
Journal of Transport Economics and Policy Volume 45, Part 1
74
along the road. The average response time is given by equation (10),
where ES is the number of emergency services. Equation (11) shows the
marginal response time:
ART ¼ 1ð2 ES þ 2Þ 
L
S
; ð10Þ
MRT ¼ @ART
@ES
¼ t ¼  1ð2 ðES þ 1Þ2Þ 
L
S
: ð11Þ
In equations (10) and (11), S is the speed of the emergency service and t
the reduction of the ID. With this reduction we can calculate the change
in welfare for an extra emergency vehicle. We can compare this welfare
change with the marginal costs (MCs) of introducing an extra vehicle.11
If the marginal costs are higher than the marginal beneﬁts, the introduc-
tion is not proﬁtable. Figure 7 shows the optimal number of emergency
services for diﬀerent values of the elasticity of demand.12 We assume that
in the initial situation there is already one emergency service in use.
The introduction of the second emergency service results in the
highest reduction of the ID and, therefore, in a higher welfare change. For
roads with high capacity use, the optimal number of emergency services
in this example is equal to 5 if the elasticity of demand is assumed to be
0. If the elasticity of demand is assumed to be 1.5, the optimal number
Figure 7
Optimal Number of Emergency Services for Two Roads (High and Average Capacity Use)
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11Costs for the car and the equipment: €50,000. We assume depreciation in ﬁve years, so we have ﬁxed
costs of €10,000 per year. The 24-hour use of an emergency vehicle is very labour intensive. There are
5 ftes (1,700 hours per year) needed to use the car 24 hours per day. Wage costs (including training
costs) are approximately €70,000 per year. Total costs: €5 70,000þ 10,000¼ 360,000 per year.
12Again we assume the values of Table 1.
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of emergency services is equal to 4. Therefore, there is a risk of over-
investing in IM policy if the demand is assumed to be inelastic in welfare
analysis. For roads with an average capacity use, the introduction of the
second emergency service is not proﬁtable, since the marginal costs
are higher than the marginal beneﬁts. The elasticity hardly inﬂuences the
estimated welfare changes in the latter case.
Finally, these results show again the importance of the diﬀerentiation
of IM policy, since the estimated marginal beneﬁts of a second emergency
service are 4.7 times higher for roads with a high density compared with
medium density. Therefore, the eﬀect of an extra emergency vehicle will
be higher for roads where the number of road users is close to capacity.
5.1 Combination of ICT and emergency services
Finally, we show the eﬀect of combining both policies. First, ICT is
introduced, and therefore the ID changes. Then, we use the new ID and
the new equilibrium situation as a starting point to determine the optimal
number of emergency services. We take the parameter values of Table 1
as the starting situation. Our analysis shows that the introduction of ICT
has a positive eﬀect on the welfare change because of an extra emergency
service. The reason for this result is that, after the introduction of ICT,
there will be more road users that beneﬁt from the introduction of an
extra emergency service. Figure 8 shows this mechanism.
Two equivalent policies are introduced. Both reduce the incident
duration by t.13 First the equilibrium average costs drop from gp 0 to
13The reduction t does not necessarily have to be the same for both policies.
Figure 8
Welfare Change for Two Independent IM Policies
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gpIM. The new equilibrium number of users is given by F1. The area
B1þC1 gives the change in welfare because of Policy 1. The second
policy results in the equilibrium average costs E(AC)IM2 and a new equili-
brium number of users of F2. The welfare gain is equal to B2þC2 and is
clearly bigger than B1þC1. Or, in other words: Policy 2 is more eﬀective
because the lower ID of Policy 1 results in a higher number of users. This
super-additivity is remarkable since in most policy analysis on traﬃc
incidents, there is sub-additivity, meaning that the eﬀect of one policy
reduces the eﬀect of another policy. The reason for this super-additivity
is that more IM results in a higher demand.
5.2 Discussion
It is clear that we have kept our model simple in order to be able to
address the research question in a transparent way. For real-world appli-
cations the model would have to be extended in several directions. We
will discuss a number of such possible extensions in this section. They
relate to: the inclusion of recurrent congestion, perception issues, hetero-
geneity of transport ﬂows, scheduling costs, and accident costs. In terms
of the type of congestion considered, we only address non-recurrent
congestion. Recurrent congestion could have been incorporated in the
model, for example, by means of a time-independent congestion model,
or a time-dependent bottleneck model (see, for example, Lindsey and
Verhoef, 2008). This would lead to additional complexity since in the
case of elastic demand, incident management would not only have an
impact on travel times during episodes when incidents occur, but also on
travel times in the absence of incidents.
A related issue is that with non-recurrent congestion, information and
perception issues may become relevant. In particular, one might argue
that in the absence of information on incidents, the elasticity of demand
may approach zero. Note, however, that during the peaks, most drivers
are commuters, implying that they are frequent road users, so that they
have been able to collect a considerable record of observations of travel
times by experience during a longer period; hence, it is safe to assume
that they are well informed on probabilities of incidents and the ensuing
delays. Further, less frequent users of the road may transfer their
experience about non-recurrent delays in some road segments to other
segments. It is clear that perception errors may occur here, since travel-
lers do not have perfect knowledge about the probabilities or simply do
not understand probabilities. An interesting direction for future research
is therefore how the measured probabilities are related to the perceived
probabilities of the travellers and their travel experience.
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In the present model we also ignore the issue of heterogeneity of
traﬃc; in particular, we ignore the coexistence of trucks and passenger
cars on the same roads. The eﬀects of heterogeneity on average speeds
and probabilities of incidents have been analysed in Rietveld and Shefer
(1998), among others. To incorporate this aspect into our model, we
would have to formulate demand for two or more groups of users in
combination with the ‘technology’ of the use of infrastrucure by diﬀerent
user groups and the possible interferences between them.
Scheduling costs are not included in this model as we only address the
expected delay of an incident. Anticipating behaviour because of variable
travel times as analysed by Peer et al. (2009a) is therefore not included.
However, our model may not be that restrictive for two reasons. First of
all, expected delay and the standard deviation of the delay are strongly
correlated, as shown by Fosgerau and Karlstro¨m (2009) and Peer et al.
(2009b). Peer et al. (2009b) show that there is almost a linear relationship
between expected delay and the standard deviation of the delay. Further-
more, Fosgerau and Karlstro¨m (2009) show that scheduling costs are
linearly, related to the standard deviation. Therefore, expected delay may
be a good proxy for generalised costs even when scheduling costs are
omitted.
Another limitation of the model is that we do not include the beneﬁt
of extra lives saved. The expected average costs in equation (7) can be
extended by including an extra term for costs of casualties due to an
incident. An intensiﬁcation of IM will therefore reduce the time until
clearing starts which is indicated as t3 t0 in Figure 1. This may have a
positive impact on the probability for seriously injured road users to
recover from their injuries and therefore on the corresponding expected
costs of an incident. The estimated beneﬁts of IM are in that case higher
than in the model we have presented.
A related point is that severity of accidents may be aﬀected by speed
levels (Shefer and Rietveld, 1997). This observation is of particular
importance when the model would incorporate congestion, for example,
by means of the well-known speed-ﬂow diagrams (Lindsey and Verhoef,
2008). In such a context, speed has become endogenous. This would lead
to an additional feedback in the model. Incident management would
aﬀect generalised costs as described in equation (7) and hence have an
impact on travel demand; travel demand would in turn aﬀect speeds
under non-incident periods which would then lead to changes in the
severity of accidents.
We conclude that the model can be extended in various directions.
These extensions will have an impact on the total costs and beneﬁts of
IM, and hence on the optimal IM level. They will also have an impact on
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the bias that will be the consequence of ignoring the elasticity of demand.
An in-depth analysis of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper.
For some of them we have indicated that they will most probably not
lead to substantial changes. For others, the consequences are less
obvious, however; we leave this as a subject for further research.
6.0 Conclusions
In this paper we have presented a simple model to optimise Incident
Management (IM) on the road, with special emphasis on its costs and
beneﬁts in terms of non-recurrent congestion. Analysing the social
beneﬁts in a demand–supply model results in signiﬁcant lower estima-
tions of social welfare due to more IM, because the lower equilibrium
average trip costs result in more demand which has an adverse eﬀect on
non-recurrent congestion. The eﬀect of the overestimation depends on
the capacity use of the road. Finally, we derive the optimal intensity for
two policies: more ICT and extra emergency services. We show that the
diﬀerentiation of IM is important, since the marginal beneﬁts of IM
services for roads with high capacity use are around ﬁve times higher
compared with roads with medium capacity use. Ignoring the elasticity of
demand results in a higher optimal intensity of IM. Therefore, there can
be a risk of overinvesting in IM-policy if demand is assumed to be
inelastic in welfare analysis.
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